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	<title>The History Book &#187; History</title>
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		<title>The End of the Old and Plans for the New Year</title>
		<link>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2011/12/the-end-of-the-old-and-plans-for-the-new-year/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2011/12/the-end-of-the-old-and-plans-for-the-new-year/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2011 12:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thehistorybook.org/?p=68</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Well where are we? I have two projects on the go at the moment the Liverpool Bay and bringing the website of the Liverpool Scottish TA regiment up to date. An informal meeting just before Christmas at the Research Society discussed what happens next year. So read on … Liverpool Scottish: Firstly the Liverpool Scottish [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Well where are we? I have two projects on the go at the moment the Liverpool Bay and bringing the website of the Liverpool Scottish TA regiment up to date. An informal meeting just before Christmas at the Research Society discussed what happens next year. So read on …</span></p>
<p><span id="more-68"></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Liverpool Scottish:</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">Firstly the <a href="http://www.liverpoolscottish.org.uk/" target="_blank">Liverpool Scottish </a>Site: As you can see the site is very old looking. To be fair it has been created by the Hon. Sec with no professional support over a number of years but he does love his colours! It was also written using Frontpage. Getting rid of the frames and introducing CSS has pushed the site beyond Frontpages capabilities. Yes I know you can do almost anything in Frontpage but to go beyond the basics you need to understand html php and javascripts etc. and there are easier ways to do those than using Frontpage. Ultimately the plan is to have a virtual museum but phase one is to update the existing site. At the moment I&#8217;m reworking the seventy odd pages to modern standards. I expect to complete by mid January and will report my experiences once completed.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">The Wrecks of Liverpool Bay:</span></strong></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">The scanning has completed and I&#8217;ve OCRed the first batch of records. I found it a bit of a chore as my OCR software was just the bundled one with the cannon scanner. As the wreck cards are written using professional jargon and shorthand, &#8216;INS&#8217; for insert for example the poor software was reduced to guessing. I have therefore splashed out and purchased (with real money!) ABBY&#8217;s OCR software Finereader. This is more accurate and once I&#8217;ve read the manual and played around a bit it started to learn so each card becomes more accurate. As the society is not meeting again until the end of January I am holding fire on this while I complete Task One above. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">The future plans about the information are coming together as various members of the society want to use the cards as source data for further research with a view to producing a definitive &#8216;wrecks of Liverpool Bay&#8217;, hopefully on-line.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">A second research project has also started based on a collection of 350 black and white negatives which have been donated to the society. This has started me looking at how to scan and store negatives and transparencies. So once the Liverpool Bay project is completed, as far as the IT bit anyway, I&#8217;ll be looking at that. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: Arial,sans-serif;">All the best to you all in the New Year and be sure the Mayans don&#8217;t get you!! </span></p>
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		<title>Like a Phoenix</title>
		<link>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2011/11/like-a-phoenix/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2011/11/like-a-phoenix/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 10:41:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thehistorybook.org/?p=31</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For the discerning amongst you it is noticeable that the site has been in hibernation since in the summer of 2009. The plans of mice and men&#8230;. Basically my degree took, if not too much time, too much energy, the idea of writing for the site as well as my degree was just a page [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">For the discerning amongst you it is noticeable that the site has been in hibernation since in the summer of 2009. The plans of mice and men&#8230;. Basically my degree took, if not too much time, too much energy, the idea of writing for the site as well as my degree was just a page too far.</p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">But time moves on and the wheel of life returns to the beginning … and all that stuff. So what now?</p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span id="more-31"></span>Since starting this project what is the (relevant) news? In the summer of 2010 I helped the local TA battalion (Liverpool Scottish) with their archive, which explains what happened to the site that summer. During the autumn and over Christmas I wrote my dissertation on the early adoption of radio in the Royal Navy. Following that, as part of the degree, I did a work placement at the Fusilier Museum in Bury in their archive (there is a pattern here). Being awarded my degree in May and being in the fortunate position of not needing to work for a living, I have been wondering what to do with my life.</p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">So here we are, I have joined the Liverpool Nautical Research Society and started a project for the Maritime Museum cataloging the Mersey Docks &amp; Harbourboard’s records of the wrecks of Liverpool Bay. The goal is, apart from producing a traditional finder&#8217;s aid, to plot the locations of the wrecks (sorry no treasure galleons) on googlemaps using the same interface as you use to find your nearest Tescos (Americans substitute “Starbucks”). I have also re-contacted the Liverpool Scottish and started helping them again.</p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">How will this effect this site? Well the original aim was to explore how the internet can help develop academic understanding of History and I think the Google project is right up that street so over the coming months I will attempt to record the development of the project.</p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">So as they say watch this space and hopefully it won&#8217;t be two years before the next post!</p>
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		<title>The Myth about The Rifle Musket</title>
		<link>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2009/07/the-myth-about-the-rifle-musket/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2009/07/the-myth-about-the-rifle-musket/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2009 12:19:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[The progress of firearms during the 19th Century has been long understood and accepted. The Napoleonic short ranged, inaccurate, smooth bored musket gave way, first to the rifle musket then the breech-loader, before reaching the pinnacle of the magazine bolt actioned rifles, such as the Short Magazine Lee Enfield. This continuous development of range and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><!-- 		@page { margin: 2cm } 		P.sdfootnote { margin-left: 0.5cm; text-indent: -0.5cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-size: 10pt } 		P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm } 		A:link { so-language: zxx } 		A.sdfootnoteanc { font-size: 57% } --></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The progress of firearms during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century has been long understood and accepted. The Napoleonic short ranged, inaccurate, smooth bored musket gave way, first to the rifle musket then the breech-loader, before reaching the pinnacle of the magazine bolt actioned rifles, such as the Short Magazine Lee Enfield. This continuous development of range and accuracy forced the parallel development of field fortifications resulting in the &#8216;hell on earth&#8217; of the trench warfare in 1914-18. A seminal example of this development was the American Civil War, troops fighting with rifled weapons capable of ranges of over 1000 yards using Napoleonic tactics, more suited to the short ranges of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, which lead inevitably to massive casualties of Pickett&#8217;s Charge and the like. In a direct response to these losses, armies developed the field fortifications of the later war, cumulating in the siege of Petersburg. This article will discuss an alternative view first offered by Paddy Griffith in 1986, developed by Brent Nosworthy and a current assessment of this view point provided by Earl J. Hess.<span id="more-18"></span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The firearm used by most combatants in the American Civil war differed from the weapons used in the Napoleonic wars in two major areas. Firstly the percussion cap had improved reliability, by removing the need to prime the weapon with gunpowder the weapon was now better able to withstand bad weather, while at the same time simplifying the loading procedure.  The second improvement was the widespread introduction of rifling. The spinning of the bullet as it travelled down the barrel increased its stability in flight. It was this stability, and the predictability it gave the weapon, which allowed aimed shots out ranges far beyond those of the un-stabilized smooth-bore musket. The impact of these improvements would have on the closely packed ranks of troops on the battlefield was apparently obvious. </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The muzzle loaded rifle musket was actually in use for a quite short period of time. The British had not completely equipped their troops, who advanced on the 20<sup>th</sup> September 1854 along side the French against the smooth-bore armed Russians. In 1859 the rifle equipped French and Austrians faced each other at Solferino but the Italians were still fought equipped with the smooth-bore weapon. The last significant war fought with muzzle loaded rifles was the American Civil War, as by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 both sides fielded breech loaded rifles. For just over ten years the rifle musket dominated the battlefield. Even as the allies stormed the redoubts of Alma however the next generation of breech loading weapons were already the standard weapon of the soldiers in the <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hg7UfLDHBoIC&amp;pg=PA17&amp;lpg=PA17&amp;dq=battle+of+Alma+rifle+musket&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=ZRUN89FEdV&amp;sig=4qaWv5IhwK4VJ5UW4bhdbT3RwoU&amp;hl=en&amp;ei=b1lcSqPNIeGfjAeyurXUDQ&amp;sa=X&amp;oi=book_result&amp;ct=result&amp;resnum=1">Prussian Army</a><a name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a>, and by 1865 a relativity small but significant number of Union troops had even been armed with repeating magazine rifles.</span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">It is the American Civil War which dominates the sources that document the history of this weapon, many due to the length of the war and the large numbers of American scholars interested in the subject. Our understanding of its impact, casualty rates and the general usage of the weapon are all effected by our understanding of that war, and as the vast majority of researchers are also American, by the seminal position that war takes in their history.  As an example of American preoccupation with the American Civil War, in his book entitled &#8216;The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat&#8217; Earl Hess cites the American Civil war as the only significant war fought with the weapon, ignoring the war of 1859 fought in northern Italy. This war which cumulated with the battle of Solferino, dwarfing those later fought between North and South in America. The suffering of 40,000 killed and wounded at Sollferino gave birth to the <a href="http://www.redcross.org.uk/standard.asp?id=90628">International Red Cross</a>, which could be argued was an event of some historical significence. </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">In 1989 Paddy Griffith published the book &#8216;<span style="font-style: normal;">Battle Tactics of the American Civil War&#8217;. He analysed  some 113 eye-witness accounts discovering that only 17 where beyond 250 yards and none beyond 500<a name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a>. His conclusion was that American Civil War Battles did not take place at ranges significantly different from those fought by Napoleon and Wellington. He also pointed out the already know examples of </span>a number of occasions when regiments of troops had formed up a few tens of yards apart and blazed away for periods of up hours and on one occasion, at Marye&#8217;s heights at Fredericksburg, for two days. If the view of the deadly accuracy and efficiency of the rifle musket was correct the regiments involved should have been wiped out in just a few minutes. The general view of the established Civil War Historians may be summed up in a review in the Journal of American History<a name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"><sup>3</sup></a>, which cited poor research and the fact that the impact of the rifle musket on the civil war battle field had long been understood. </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The next major work on the subject was provided by Brent Nosworthy in his book &#8216;The Bloody Crucible of Courage&#8217;. The book deals with the battlefield tactics of all arms Naval, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry. Nosworthy agrees with Griffith but goes on to explain how a weapon which could repeatedly hit a target up to 1000 yards away, could allow battles between close ordered regiments at only a few tens of yards<a name="sdfootnote4anc" href="#sdfootnote4sym"><sup>4</sup></a>. <a href="http://library.med.utah.edu/WebPath/TUTORIAL/GUNS/GUNBLST.html">The answer was ballistics</a>. The very method of imparted the spin to the projectile as it passed down the barrel of the gun, also slowed it down. The effect of this was to make the muzzle velocity of the rifle musket could be as much as 40% less than an earlier smooth-bore.  The sights fitted of course accounted for this lower velocity by forcing the firer to point the weapon upwards. The ballistic arc of the gun however was very steep, meaning that for a large part of its flight the bullet would pass over the heads of troops standing in front of the firer. Nosworthy records French experiments that show the danger zone where the bullet is below head height and before it hits the ground to be at 993 yards only 12yards wide<a name="sdfootnote5anc" href="#sdfootnote5sym"><sup>5</sup></a>. Nor was the rifle musket better at short ranges even at a 100 yards the flatter trajectory of the smooth bore was seen by many who studied the matter better<a name="sdfootnote6anc" href="#sdfootnote6sym"><sup>6</sup></a>.  The difficulty in hitting the target could be over come by training, as the weapon was intrinsically more accurate that it&#8217;s predecessor, the armies of the American Civil War were not however trained. The essentially amateur officer corps relied on a mix of recycled manuals and instructional pamphlets to learn their trade. These emphasized the need to hold fire until the last minute so as not to wast ammunition and in one cases to point the rifle at the knees of the approaching enemy<a name="sdfootnote7anc" href="#sdfootnote7sym"><sup>7</sup></a>. The techniques enshrined in these manuals are those which the combatants of the wars of the French revolution would have received sixty years earlier. The American officer corps were not unique in the Napoleonic approach to battlefield tactics Jomini believed that the new rifle musket would only change minor tactics.<a name="sdfootnote8anc" href="#sdfootnote8sym"><sup>8</sup></a> For the private soldier on the battlefield any native ability would also be lost as he was required to deliver rapid volleys of fire not to take deliberate aim. </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-style: normal;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">In 1989 Griffith had pointed out that the accepted view of how a American Civil War battle was fought could not be sustained, and Nosworthy had explained how the apparent wonder weapon had failed to deliver its promised lethality. There still remained some serious questions however, General Sedwick may not have uttered his famous last words but he did die, and if fear of the vaulted rifle musket did not cause the creation of the fieldworks of the later war then why build them?</span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-style: normal;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">In 2008 Earl J. Hess, an acknowledged expert on the Civil War and in particular it&#8217;s trench warfare,  published his views on the controversy.  Expanding on Griffith&#8217;s survey of eye-witness accounts and the technical manuals of Nosworthy he concluded that they were correct. The battlefield of the American Civil War was, due to training, doctrine, and the difficulty of delivering accurate aimed fire, essentially the same as it&#8217;s Napoleonic ancestor<a name="sdfootnote9anc" href="#sdfootnote9sym"><sup>9</sup></a>. The key to this conclusion was the phrase &#8216;the battlefield&#8217;, he argues however that the rifle musket comes into it&#8217;s own and starts the evolution of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century battlefield by its use in skirmishing.   During the war Union and Confederate armies spent long periods of inactivity relatively close to each. During these period large numbers of pickets  would fight a form of guerilla war attempting to harass the enemy main army. Hess&#8217;s book is replete with tables of ranges and ammunition allocation and expenditure rates, these are used to support his arguments. The analysis shows that ammunition expenditure of some units during these periods of supposed inactivity where as high as in battle and maintained over far longer periods of time. During the siege of Atlanta for example, the 96<sup>th</sup> Illinois maintained a third of its number as pickets firing between three and five thousand rounds per day<a name="sdfootnote10anc" href="#sdfootnote10sym"><sup>10</sup></a>. Recording the exploits of these skirmishers he identifies that the skills learnt in the picket line did not translate back to the battlefield as even dedicated skirmish units when pressed into battle performed similarly to other units in the battle-line<a name="sdfootnote11anc" href="#sdfootnote11sym"><sup>11</sup></a>. </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-style: normal;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">In essence Hess argues that while on the battlefield, troops had neither the time nor inclination to produce aimed fire, the constant skirmishing did allow the exploitation of the range and accuracy of the rifle musket, and it was this which kick-started the development of the elaborate earthworks of Petersburg and other late war battlefields.</span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-style: normal;" align="left">
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; font-style: normal; page-break-before: always;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Bibliography</span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; font-style: normal;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Griffith, Paddy. Battle tactics of the Civil War (1989), Yale University Press, </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm; font-style: normal;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Hagerman, Edward <em>. The American Civil War and the origins of modern warfare: ideas, organization, and field command, (1992), </em>Indiana University Press</span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-style: normal;">Hess, Earl. J. The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth,(2008), University Press of Kansas</span></span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="color: #000000;">Jamieson, Perry,The Journal of American History, (1990), vol:77 iss:1 p314 -315 </span> </span></span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0.4cm;" align="left"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">Nosworthy, Brent. The Bloody Crucible of Courage,(2005),London,Constable &amp; Robinson Ltd</span></span></p>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a>Hagerman, 	Edward <em>. The American Civil War and the origins of modern 	warfare: ideas, organization, and field command, (1992), </em>Indiana 	University Press, p17</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote2">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a>Hess, 	Earl. J. <em>The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and 	Myth,</em>(2008), University Press of Kansas,  p101</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote3">
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a>Jamieson, 	Perry,<em>The Journal of American History,</em> (1990), vol:77 iss:1 	p314 -315 </span></span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote4">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote4sym" href="#sdfootnote4anc">4</a>Nosworthy, 	Brent. T<em>he Bloody Crucible of Courage</em>,(2005),London,Constable 	&amp; Robinson Ltd, p 30</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote5">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote5sym" href="#sdfootnote5anc">5</a>Nosworthy, 	Brent. <em>The Bloody Crucible of Courage</em>, p33</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote6">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote6sym" href="#sdfootnote6anc">6</a>Nosworthy, 	Brent. <em>The Bloody Crucible of Courage</em> p53</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote7">
<p><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote7sym" href="#sdfootnote7anc">7</a>Hess, 	Earl. J. <em>The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat</em>, p91</span></span></div>
<div id="sdfootnote8">
<p style="margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><a name="sdfootnote8sym" href="#sdfootnote8anc">8</a> Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the origins of 	modern warfare, p18</span></span></p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote9">
<p><a name="sdfootnote9sym" href="#sdfootnote9anc">9</a><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Hess, 	Earl. J. The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat,</span></span> p108</div>
<div id="sdfootnote10">
<p><a name="sdfootnote10sym" href="#sdfootnote10anc">10</a><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Hess, 	Earl. J. The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat,</span></span> p161</div>
<div id="sdfootnote11">
<p><a name="sdfootnote11sym" href="#sdfootnote11anc">11</a><span style="font-family: Verdana,sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Hess, 	Earl. J. The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat,</span></span> p140</div>
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		<title>How Guilty were the Austro-Hungarian regime for the outbreak of the First World War?</title>
		<link>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2009/07/hello-world/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thehistorybook.org/index.php/2009/07/hello-world/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 13:10:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Guilt is a difficult word to define, we tend to ascribe more guilt depending on the consequences of an action, rather than focus on the actual actions of the participates. The point of this article is to argue that Austro-Hungarian declaration and subsequent invasion of Serbia did not inevitably lead to the First World War, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Guilt is a difficult word to define, we tend to ascribe more guilt depending on the consequences of an action, rather than focus on the actual actions of the participates. The point of this article is to argue that Austro-Hungarian declaration and subsequent invasion of Serbia did not inevitably lead to the First World War, and their actions were constant with similar events which did and do not attract the burden of guilt that the events of July 1914 attract. The article will focus on the actions and intentions of the various participates and whether those actions could be considered reasonable at the time, rather than consider the catastrophic results of those actions.<span id="more-1"></span><br />
It is undoubtedly true, that with the declaration of war on the 28th and the bombardment of Belgrade on 29th July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Empire began the final act of turning Grey&#8217;s European lamps out and plunging Europe into the long night of the First World War1. Austro Hungarian however, that unlike the other Great Powers at the time, faced real and imminent dangers and dealt with those dangers using the tried and trusted methods of the preceding decades. It was Germany&#8217;s reckless intention to start a European war, that betrayed the empire of Franz-Josef to eventual destruction and not the actions of a desperate regime in Vienna.<br />
In the summer of 1914 Austro-Hungary faced, the growth of Serbia, a serious threat on its southern border. The threat posed by an independent state to the empire was not academic to Vienna, this type of threat had been faced before, in Italy. Following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the Austrian empire had dominated the Italian peninsular. However over the next fifty years the example and encouragement of the independent Italian Kingdom of Piedmont for Italian nationalist within the empire had resulted in progressive lose of power and territory, until by 1866 only a small rump remained of the once extensive Italian provinces. The example of Piedmont is so iconic that it has given its name to the effect of an independent nationalistic state has on its neighbours who share national minorities. This effect is called the &#8216;Piedmont Principle 2. The problem of a determined and dynamic independent state, which could motivate anti-imperial sentiments, was therefore well understood by the regime in Vienna, and Serbia was the self proclaimed Piedmont of the southern Slavs3. If the empire lost the Slavic peoples as it had in Italy, the impact could well prove fatal. This Austro-Hungarian preoccupation with the Balkans and internal matters was even commented on by Sir Edward Grey the British foreign Minister in 19114.<br />
Austro-Hungarian empire was particularly vulnerable to pressures that a nation such as Serbia could exert. The Empire was formed from by an accretion of lands and peoples to the Hapsburg Dynasty, as a result it was made up of an bewildering mix of nationalities and religions, the majority was formed from 10 millions Germans and more than 9 million Hungarians or Magyar, the major other nationalities being Slavs (Slovaks, Croatians, and Serbs), Romanians, Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs and the remaining Italians5.<br />
This bewildering collection of people was ruled over by the Dual Monarchy, this constitution had come into being in 1867. The arrangement split the empire in two, one part ruled by the Hungarians the other Germans, there were also three imperial ministries, the Ministry of War, the Foreign Office and the Common Finance Ministry. This constitution placed the Magyars in a privileged position compared to the other nationalities, such as the significant Slavic population, having gained that position they set about ensuring that no other national group would gain similar concessions and thus diminish Hungarian power6. This concern over Magyar imperial supremacy is evident even on the eve of the Great War, Istvan Tisza the Hungarian prime minister opposed the war with Serbia, as the inclusion of so many Slavs would threaten the position of Hungarians within the Empire7. As both German (Austrian) and Hungarian parliaments had to agree any imperial budgets and with Hungary agitating for more control of the army while blocking any concessions which the empire may have considered granting to its minorities. The Empire became paralysed and the fault lines along which the empire would eventually split in 1918 were evident well before 1914. Unable to deal effectively with internal national aspirations due to Magyar intransigents the empire was forced to ensure that external factors did not make the situation worse.<br />
Serbia had begun emerging as a significant threat in 1878 when following the Treaty of San Stefano. This treaty concluded the Russo-Turkish War, as part of the treaty Serbia became a large independent state. In Berlin in 1879 the Great Powers reversed most of the conditions in the treaty, including reducing the size of Serbia, Austria occupied a number of Turkish provinces including Bosnia and Herzogovina supposedly to protect Turkish sovereignty8. In an attempt to reduce the Piedmont effect on the empires Slavic minorities, Austrian policy from this time on was to try to ensure neither Serbia or Bulgaria the two major Balkan Slavic powers became dominate or too large. These efforts were not only Military in nature but had often political and economic dimensions such as in 1906 when an Austria placed an embargo on the importing of Serbia livestock in response to Serbian purchasing of artillery from France rather than Austro-Hungary9. The main diplomatic card played by the Austro-Hungarian empire in the final years leading to the First World war was however military. It should not be considered however a uniquely Austrian response to diplomacy, in 1912 for example, Russia used the mobilisation of troops both against Turkey in March10, Germany and Austria in September, and in support of Turkey in November11.<br />
1908 marked a shift to Austrian use of armed diplomacy, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzogovina, the resulting crisis with both Serbia and Montenegro produced a significant increase in troop numbers. Ultimately the Slavic states backed down, although the tension with Russia in Galicia took longer to resolve. Vienna, repeatedly and successfully, resorted to the threat of war during the 1st and 2nd Balkan wars no less than three times. The first two as a result of Serbian expansion to the Adriatic coast, which Austria sought to prevent by the creation of Albania12. The third mobilization was in support of Bulgaria during the 2nd Balkan war13. In all of these crisis the immediate goals of the empire where met, this would have reinforced an expectation that military force could be used successfully to control the southern Slavic states. However Serbia came out of the Balkan Wars stronger in both territory and population. Also having emerged as the leading Slavic state, due to defeating her main rival Bulgaria, was able to become more belligerent towards the Austro-Hungarian rule. Another downside for the Austrians of repeated mobilisations was the cost, 200 million crowns had been spent to fund the mobilisation in December 1912 alone, the Prime minister of Austria declared that a war would be cheaper than continuously mobilizing the army14.<br />
By the summer of 1914 an number of factors conspired to effect Austrian decision making. Continuously threatening war, while successful in the short term, was not effective in the medium to long term, as Serbia continued to grow in strength, while the cost of this policy was proving unsustainable. The threat of Serbia to the empire was not diminishing and needed to be resolved, particularly as Serbia had doubled in size and, once the effect of the increased population was assimilated into the army, would soon become a significant military force. These pressures meant that the next crisis would need to provide a final resolution to the Serbian problem15.<br />
The crisis which would provide that opportunity to resolve the issue with Serbia occurred on the 28th June 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand the heir to the imperial crown. The actual involvement of the Serbian government in the killing is confusing as while governmental figures such as the chief of military intelligence were personally involved, the civilian government did not approve, but made only ineffective steps to prevent the attack. The connection was enough however for the imperial council in Vienna to decide two days later on the 30th June to make this the casus-belli for a war with Serbia16.<br />
No action could be successfully taken without German support however as Serbia had a powerful ally in the shape of Russia, and on 6th July Bethmann Hollweg, the Chancellor of Germany, informed Count Hoyos, an emissary sent to Berlin to gain German support, that Germany would indeed support any action against Serbia, this was the famous &#8216;Blank Cheque&#8217;17. The question of Austrian guilt for the start of the war largely rests on what was expected from Germany in the way of support. The normal process, which had existed for a hundred years, was that following Austria&#8217;s ultimatum to Serbia, Germany would summon a conference of Great Powers, by the time the conference convened Austria would have defeated Serbia and the conference would resolve the aftermath peacefully, with suitable concessions all round. German actions between the 6th and 25th of July appeared to follow this pattern, with the encouragement from Berlin to deal with Serbia once and for all18. With Germany urging quick and decisive action against Serbia Vienna continued with its plans to defeat Serbia, in a localized conflict, having politically trumped Serbia&#8217;s Russian ally.<br />
Not until 30th July when Molkte, the German chief of staff, contacted Conrad von Hotzendorf, his Austrian equivalent, to urge a quick resolution to the Serbian conflict as Germany expected significant Austrian support to defend the joint eastern borders is any hint of the wider conflict raised, but even that message ambiguously placed Serbian defeat before the conflict with Russia. It was the telegram of the 31st from the Kaiser to Franz Josef which starkly defined the actual German position.<br />
&#8216;In this gigantic struggle on which we are embarking shoulder to shoulder, Serbia plays a quite subordinate role, which demands only the absolutely necessary defensive measures.&#8217;19<br />
This telegram shows how the Austrian plan for a localized war with Serbia had been hijacked by German intentions. Instead of dealing with a manageable Serbian war the Austro-Hungarians were expected to defend Germany, their supposed supporter, while German armies invaded Belgium and France a continent away from Austrian concerns. This was clearly not what Hoyos had travelled to Berlin in early July to request. The scale of this misunderstanding and the shock produced by the realisation can be seen by the reaction of the Austrian high command.<br />
Austria had two war plans, one aimed Russia the other Serbia, with the 2nd Army providing the decisive superiority when committed on either the Galician or Serbian theatre, depending on the war plan chosen. But Austria had only ordered a partially mobilisation aimed a Serbia, of all the countries which mobilised during those fateful weeks only Austria that had to change its mobilization plan once initiated, with unsurprising chaotic results20. If the empire had expected the call to Germany for aid as a military intervention rather than political, it would have been easier and far more sensible for Austria to support its German ally against Russia by mobilized its armies in Galicia as planned for, but they did not.<br />
Is the Austro-Hungarian regime therefore to carry the burden of guilt for the outbreak of the First World War? Of all the Great Powers in 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Empire faced the most severe threat to its existence. Handicapped by Hungarian intransigents over concessions to other minorities within the empire, the pressures of an expanding and aggressive Serbia could easily have shattered the empire along similar lines, which in 1918, the strain of losing the First World War provided. Using the same techniques which were part of a successful and well late 19th century diplomacy, Austria committed to resolving the problem in the only way left to her. The Austro-Hungarian empire declared war on 28th July not to start a pan-European war but to preserve its position in the Balkans21 and therefore its own domestic stability. If Austro-Hungary must carry any burden of guilt it is the naivety of its dealings with Germany that it lies, for it was not Austrian plans for war, but their betrayal for the larger German scheme, which ultimately changed a manageable local conflict into the catastrophic affair which would last for the next five years and which still reverberates to this day.</p>
<p>BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
Gooch, GP.&amp; Templey, H.,&#8217;Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence&#8217;,26 May 1911,,British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Vol. VI,(1930), London, HMSO<br />
Hall, Richard C.,The Balkan Wars 1912-1913; Prelude to the First World War, (2000),London, Routlridge<br />
Haythornthwaite, Philip J.,The World War One Source Book, (1992),London, Arms and Amour Press<br />
Joll, Jamers and Martel, Gordon,The Origins of the First World War (3rd Ed),(2007),London, Pearson Education Limited<br />
Martin Terry ,The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,The Journal of Modern History, (1988), 70,4, p813 -861<br />
Mombauer, Annika,The Origins of The First World War; Controversies and Consensus,(2002),London, Pearson Education Limited<br />
Stevenson, David,Armaments and the Coming of War; Europe 1904-1914,(1996),Oxford, Oxford University Press<br />
Strachan, Hew,The First World War: Vol1 To Arms,Oxford, Oxford University Press<br />
Wilson, K.M. (ed.),Decisions for War, 1914, (London, 1995) ,London : UCL Press, 1995.</p>
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